This paper examines how the individual and country-level factors affect
INTRODUCTION
Welfare state attitudes, i.e. normative orientations towards public policies and distribution of resources (Svallfors, 2012a) differ among the citizens and various countries. Both citizens and various nations hold different understandings and beliefs about social problems and most particularly about individuals', state and other institutions' responsibilities in taking care of social issues (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003) . As welfare state attitudes become deeply embedded in people's preferences and expectations (Brooks & Manza, 2007) and thus hard to change, they may provide legitimacy for the institutional persistence that obstructs policy changes (Svallfors, 2012a) . Citizens' attitudes may also shape voting decisions, so it is relevant to explore and understand them from a policy perspective (Goerres & Tepe, 2012) .
Research interest for this area is growing, and many studies examine the determinants of the welfare state attitudes (Svallfors, 2012a) and a cross-country variation in these attitudes (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Jaeger, 2006a; Goerres & Tepe, 2012; Guo & Gilbert, 2014) . While the earliest studies looked only at individual-level characteristics as predictors of differences in the welfare state attitudes, recent studies brought into focus the country-level determinants. Such studies examined country's cultural, institutional and structural characteristics or the interaction of aggregate-level and individual-level factors in order to explain cross-country variation in welfare state attitudes (Andreß & Heien, 2001) . Several studies have also focused on testing the regime thesis and examined a possible link between the welfare regimes and the welfare state attitudes (e.g. Jakobsen, 2011; Goerres & Tepe, 2012; Vučković Juroš 2012; Guo & Gilbert, 2014) .
Results of such studies are mixed, which is not surprising considering that they relied on different datasets, covered various countries and dimensions of welfare state attitudes and were grounded on different theoretical assumptions. Still, Svallfors (2012a) claims that an important common finding suggests that universal social policy programs (e.g. pensions, health care) enjoy stronger support compared to targeted programs (e.g. social assistance, unemployment benefits). The welfare state attitudes are thus multidimensional and citizens may hold different beliefs about state responsibility and redistribution depending on the social policy area (Pettersen, 2001; Busemeyer et al., 2009; Svallfors, 2011; Guo & Gilbert, 2014) .
These findings question the comparative studies of the determinants of the welfare state attitudes which relied on public support for redistribution or aggregate indices as dependent variables (Jaeger, 2006a; Busemeyer et al., 2009; Jordan, 2013) . First, the studies predicting public support for redistribution often measure only one aspect of the welfare state attitudes, a support towards targeted programs which aim at redistribution from the rich to the poor. However, many social policy areas (family policy included) cannot be viewed solely through the "redistribution lens". Second, the studies using aggregate indices as dependent variables are comprised from heterogeneous survey questions dealing with attitudes towards various policies (e.g. education, employment, pensions) or welfare state functions. As these policies cover a wide range of activities with distinct characteristics and functions, aimed at support for very different groups, it is not surprising that such studies do not find a consistent impact of different determinants on the welfare state attitudes.
It is, therefore, necessary to explore in more detail the citizens' attitudes towards specific social policy programs. As Jordan (2013) argues, a programmatic approach allows linking public support for specific social programs to its unique structural characteristics and investigating support for those programs that may not perfectly fit into the broader welfare regime type of a particular country. This is particularly true for policies aimed to address (new) social risks (e.g. Bonoli, 2005 Bonoli, , 2007 , such as the work-family policies which put special focus on childcare, questioning traditional modes of family solidarity and division of responsibility for care between the family, state, market and other actors (e.g. Saraceno, 2011; Morgan, 2012; Blum et al., 2014) . Still, little is known about public attitudes towards childcare policies. Only recently there were a few attempts to explore attitudes towards the childcare (e.g. Goerres & Tepe, 2010 Guo & Gilbert, 2014) . However, these studies predominantly covered western European countries and focused only on the attitudes about the government's role, rather than the choice between various actors (e.g. family, employers) that may be construed as responsible for childcare provisions. Also, when testing a regime thesis, these studies relied solely on "classical" regime typology developed by Esping-Andersen (1990 , 1999 , which does not capture the differences in the design of family policies well.
This paper thus aims to provide an additional insight into public attitudes towards childcare, one of the core policy areas of the social investment agenda. This topic currently dominates public discourse in the social policy area at European level with the request for the increased state intervention (e.g. Morgan, 2012; Europska komisija, 2013) . However, even though some countries with a long tradition of familialistic family policies opted for policy reforms that increased state responsibility in childcare (e.g. Austria, Germany, see Seeleib-Kaiser, 2010; Blum et al., 2014) , that is not a widespread practice within Europe (e.g. the Czech Republic, see Blum et al., 2014) . As citizens' attitudes towards the government's role in social area may influence reforms by providing legitimacy for the institutional persistence or policy change (Goerres & Tepe, 2012) , it is of particular interest to explore the extent to which a newly emerging social investment agenda is supported in public attitudes in various European countries characterised by different social context and welfare regimes, particularly whether the socialisation in particular welfare regime may constrain or enable policy reforms aimed at the increased state intervention in childcare. Therefore, we have examined how the individual characteristics and broader contextual factors are associated with the probability of support for the government's responsibility for childcare, as opposed to the responsibility of other actors, in 24 European countries. Svallfors (2012b) argues that research on welfare state attitudes is grounded on two approaches, a political economy approach and a political-sociological approach. The political economy approach claims that the welfare state attitudes reflect the self-interest of individuals. Based on rational choice arguments, this approach assumes that individuals will support those aspects of the welfare state from which they (may) gain personally. Therefore, the welfare state attitudes depend on citizens' structural position, that is, on their socioeconomic situations or anticipated risks in their life cycle (e.g. Andreß & Heien, 2001; Iversen & Soskice, 2001; Cusack et al., 2006; Busemeyer et al., 2009; Goerres & Tepe, 2010) . It is typically expected that (future) parents, women, full-time employed and "poorer" individuals are more supportive of childcare policies alleviating their responsibility (Cusack et al. 2006; Goerres & Tepe, 2012; Guo & Gilbert, 2014) . The welfare state attitudes are also influenced by the educational level, which has a negative effect on the support for redistributive policies (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Jaeger, 2006a ; for childcare policy Guo & Gilbert, 2014) . 1 Still, individual self-interest has a limited role in the formation of welfare state attitudes and a broader explanatory framework is needed to understand them (Svallfors 2012b ). This argument was also supported by recent works exploring the attitudes towards the childcare policies. For example, Goerres & Tepe (2010) showed that age-based self-interest provides an oversimplified explanation of the formation of redistributive preferences, i.e. that the intergenerational solidarity within the family may change age-related policy preferences and result in the support for state intervention in childcare among the elderly as well. Moreover, Guo & Gilbert (2014) analysis indicates that the effect of selfinterest factors varies among the welfare regimes, 2 implying that the attitudes towards childcare are context-dependant. Hence, the reasons for differences in attitudes must be sought out at the institutional level, as well as at the political, socio-economic and cultural level (see Goerres & Tepe, 2012; Guo & Gilbert, 2014) .
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Determinants of Welfare State Attitudes
There has been some research on the self-interest at the aggregate level as well. For example, Blekesaune & Quadagno (2003) showed that support for welfare policies is higher in the context marked by high unemployment, and that unemployment has stronger effect on the welfare state attitudes on the aggregate level than at the individual level.
3 Exploring the attitudes towards the childcare, Guo & Gilbert (2014) also suggest the importance of broader societal context. Admittedly, they assessed solely a general effect of unmeasured factors in societal context, but Goerres & Tepe (2010) have estimated specific contextual self-interest variables and they have found that the elderly are more supportive of the public childcare provisions in the context marked by lower female labour market participation (e.g. Italy, Spain), where the childcare provision have not been meet.
The scholars of the political-sociological approach try to move beyond the selfinterest arguing that a wider social context also has an important role in the formation and persistence of welfare state attitudes, notably a political ideology and/or socialization patterns, reflecting broader considerations about social justice, social rights and reciprocity (e.g. Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Goerres & Tepe, 2012; Svallfors, 2012a; Vučković Juroš, 2012; Guo & Gilbert, 2014) . For example, it is expected that socialisation in a particular welfare regime or growing up in a religious community may influence citizens' attitudes towards family life (see Goerres & Tepe, 2012; Guo & Gilbert, 2014) . Modernity and individualism may also play an important role (Daatland & Lowenstain, 2005) , as well as the growing educational level of women or women's greater participation in the labour market. These factors may operate at both individual and aggregate levels.
At the individual level, the political-sociological approach assumes that citizens' support for welfare state is rooted in personal political values and beliefs and may 1 Self-interest factors such as income, educational background, social class, employment status, age and gender are generally viewed as reflecting differences in (future) risk perception (Blomberg et al., 2012) . However, they are also related to the differences in socialisation patterns (Andreß & Heien, 2001) .
2 Solely having a child at home showed the same pattern among the regimes, contributing to greater support for government's intervention in childcare. The perception of need and educational level were significant in the Liberal and Southern regimes, and gender in the Social-democratic and Continental regimes (Guo & Gilbert, 2014) .
3 High unemployment may increase public empathy for the unemployed as there is a greater risk that one may become unemployed (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003) . be explained by political orientation and ideological preferences (Jaeger, 2006b) . In general, greater support for egalitarian and social justice beliefs should result in greater support for redistributive policies (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Guo & Gilbert, 2014) . There is also some evidence that the leftists are more supportive of the state support in the area of family policy (Goerres & Tepe, 2012) . Previous works have also controlled for age, gender, education, class and/or employment status, as it was believed that they determine socialization (see e.g. Andreß & Heien, 2001 ). However, these factors speak more about current structural position than about socialisation patterns, especially in the context of childcare policies. Therefore, we treat them primarily as self-interest individual determinants, and focus on those factors that may reflect specificity of socialisation patterns at young age 4 such as exposure to (non-)traditional gender role models. For example, McGinn et al.'s research (2015) speaks of the importance of mother's employment for adult men and women's involvement in paid and unpaid work.
5 Although this research examines actual practices, it suggests an importance of exposure to (non-)traditional gender role models for work and care-related attitudes.
At the country level, the effect of political ideology, especially in the area of family policy is not clear (for a review, see Goerres & Tepe, 2012) . Moreover, Bolzendahl's research (2009) suggests that it is women's legislative presence, which is not solely tied to the left parties, that has the strongest effect on higher social spending and not the left-wing governments by themselves. Comparative policy analysis of family policies in post-communist countries suggests that this is particularly so in the area of family policies, since the women's groups affiliated with political parties played an important role in development of family policies (Dobrotić, 2012) . Finally, examinations of both the political ideology and socialization patterns give support to the regime thesis, which is tested by a growing body of research studying the link between the welfare state attitudes and the welfare regimes (e.g. Mau, 2004; Jakobsen, 2011; Goerres & Tepe, 2012; Vuč-ković Juroš, 2012; Guo & Gilbert, 2014) . The welfare regimes are assumed to shape public preferences for the state intervention in social area either through education and socialisation, or through daily interaction with the welfare state institutions. On one hand individuals are taught to respect dominant values and norms of society (Jakobsen, 2011) and, on the other hand, the implementation of social policies shapes citizens' opinions about different social policy programs and the need for redistribution (Guo & Gilbert, 2014) . As the welfare regimes have different histories, various institutional arrangements between the state, market and family, and are characterised by distinct political values and ideologies (Mau, 2004; Jakobsen, 2011; Svallfors, 2012) , one expects cross-country variation in the welfare state attitudes that are consistent with the welfare regime typologies. Nevertheless, previous studies have not unequivocally supported the regime thesis. Some studies proved that welfare state attitudes cluster around the welfare regimes, while others found a limited effect of the welfare regimes on the welfare state attitudes or the correlation was not in the expected direction (e.g. Gelissen, 2000; Andreß & Heien, 2001; Jakobsen, 2011; Vučko-vić Juroš, 2012) . The similar is true of the childcare attitudes (Goerres & Tepe, 2010; Guo & Gilbert, 2014) . These inconsistent findings are often attributed to conceptual and empirical problems with welfare regime classifications (Svallfors, 2012) , which are elaborated in more detail below.
Welfare Regimes and Childcare Attitudes
Comparative studies examining the regime thesis are criticised for several conceptual and empirical problems. First, the previously mentioned dependent variable problem (predominant reliance on the public support for redistribution or the use of diverse aggregate indices as dependent variables) may have contributed to the inconsistent findings of earlier studies (see Jaeger, 2006a; Busemeyer et al., 2009; Jordan, 2013) . These studies did not account for citizens' attitudes towards various characteristics and functions of the welfare state reflecting different theoretical dimensions of attitudes (Jaeger, 2006a) , and for the difference in beliefs about the state responsibility and redistribution across different social policy areas (Svallfors, 2012a ). Jaeger's solution (2006a) to this problem is restricting the analysis of regime differences on citizens' support for redistribution, as more cross-national variation may be found in the preferred scope of redistribution than in the perception of the state responsibility for people in need. In contrast, Jordan (2013) advocates a programmatic approach which we adopt in this paper. Jordan argues that the support for redistribution measures only one element of welfare state attitudes, i.e. redistribution from the rich to the poor, while programmatic approach allows linking public support for specific social programs to their unique structural characteristics, and investigating the support for those programs that may not perfectly fit into a broader welfare regime type of a particular country.
This brings up the second problem, the previous studies' reliance on EspingAndersen's typology of welfare regimes which may fail to capture the internal diversity of welfare state design (Jaeger, 2006a; Jordan, 2013) . Countries may have different approaches to welfare sectors, what may result in diverse levels and features of public support for various programs. Childcare policies are particularly sensitive to this criticism in light of the feminist scholars' claims that Esping-Andersen's typology is gender-blind and their pointing out that Esping-Andersen did not consider family policy when developing his typology. Several re-conceptualizations of Esping-Andersen's regime typology, therefore, explored the implications of the welfare state on women's position in the family and the labour market (see e.g. Lewis, 1992; Sainsbury, 1996; Korpi, 2000) . While these studies used various operational measures, their regime classifications are still very close to Esping-Andersen's typology (Guo & Gilbert, 2012 , 2014 6 and a bigger problem stems from analytical approaches which apply a reductionist notion of the welfare regimes concept, i.e. which treat individual countries as manifestations of welfare regimes.
7 Such studies actually analyse attitudinal cleavages within individual countries, which for them represent particular welfare regimes, and fail to test a regime thesis per se (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Jaeger, 2006a) .
The third concern is related to the applicability of Esping-Andersen's typology to current welfare states as the descriptive power of his regime classification may be undermined in light of the last two decades' intensive reform processes (Jordan, 2013) . While we are aware of this concern, we do not address it specifically in this paper as a more comprehensive reforms of the childcare policies started only recently in European countries and in this paper we focus on the effects of socialisation in a particular welfare regime on childcare attitudes. Moreover, Goerres & Tepe (2012) showed that the welfare state attitudes are highly path-dependant and inter-individual differences in public support for childcare remain stable even in contexts marked by paradigmatic shifts in family policy. This stresses the importance of policy feedback effect, which claims that institutional and policy environment may have an important role in shaping the welfare state attitudes. Namely, existing policies may reshape interests and create new interest groups hindering the retrenchment of social programs (e.g. Pierson, 1994 Pierson, , 1996 . Hence, although Blekesaune & Quadagno (2003) are concerned about an assumption of one-way causation from policies to attitudes in studies testing the regime thesis, a historical institutionalism gives theoretical grounds for this premise.
In spite of various criticisms, EspingAndersen's typology remains the main welfare regime classification used in empirical works. Although it underwent several re-conceptualisations based on different indicators, they all resulted in similar classifications and it has been shown that "three worlds of welfare capitalism" still have a heuristic value in analysing institutional arrangements (Arts & Gelissen, 2002) . However, there is a case for extending the number of welfare regimes and it became widely accepted to situate Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece into separate Mediterranean or Southern regime as they share some similar characteristics, such as weak state institutions, political parties as main actors for interest articulation, ideological polarizations and a strong religious influence followed by the important role of the traditional family (Ferrera, 1996) . For pragmatic reasons, the post-communist countries are also often placed within the separate, post-communist regime. Due to their common experience of communist statism these countries are expected to have similar expectations about the role of the state in social area (e. g. Vučković Juroš, 2012).
Esping-Andersen' (1999) three welfare regimes have the following characteristics in the area of family policy. SocialDemocratic Regime is marked by strong government's role, comprehensive childhood education and care system in which services are predominantly publicly provided and financed. Countries belonging to the Conservative-Corporatist Regime are organised around subsidiarity principle and their family policies have traditionally stressed the role of traditional family in childcare and discouraged a female labour market participation, which resulted in underdeveloped early childhood education and care systems, especially for children under the age of three. The state interventi-on in childcare is the lowest in Liberal Regime, which favours the market in service provision and where one can find noticeable class differences in childcare arrangements (see Michel & Mahon, 2002) . In the extension of Esping-Andersen's typology, countries of the Southern Regime are marked by underdeveloped early childhood education and care services (Bettio & Plantenga, 2004 ) and the widespread practice of informal care provision (e.g. Igel & Szydlik, 2011) . The family policy in post-communist countries have often been labelled "refamilialised" (e.g. Haintrains, 2004) as it has been assumed that after 1990 they supported women to return to care by providing them long leaves and lowering the state support for childcare.
These arguments pose challenges to the present paper. We can hardly treat the post-communist countries as a homogeneous group when it comes to family policies. Namely, there are notable differences in family policies in those countries, and many of them originate all the way back from the socialist period (see Inglot, 2008; Inglot et al., 2011; Dobrotić, 2012) . Javornik (2014) showed that in the area of childcare policies they share different core characteristics inherent to Esping-Andersen's typology. For example, Slovenia and Lithuania share social democratic ideas of the Nordic countries which view childcare as a social responsibility; Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia give priority to financially supported family childcare; while Poland and Slovakia share some similarities with liberal regime as their policies are marked by a lack of public support for childcare. Similar differences may also be found between countries belonging to other regimes. For example, opposite to other members of Southern Regime, an emphasis on support for full-time dual earner parents in Portugal was followed by a growing availability of full-time childcare services. Similarly, while the Netherlands' policy model has been closely connected to part-time work and part-time childcare provision, Germany and Austria have traditionally supported family care, while France and Belgium have opted for a model that offers parents to choose between long leaves and childcare services (Escobedo & Wall, 2015) . Hence, it is advisable to test the regime thesis applying a more nuanced categorization of childcare policies.
One such categorization is Leitner's (2003) "Varieties of Familialism" typology, which is more sensitive to the implications of the welfare state on women's position in the family and the labour market, and specifically to the fact that policy affects allocation of childcare responsibilities between the state, family and market, as well as within the family (see Table 1 ). This categorization, therefore, may better account for cross-national variations in childcare attitudes. 8 Leitner developed a gender-sensitive classification based on the degree to which welfare states strengthen or unburden family in its caring function and reinforce gendered care giving. This classification groups countries into four regimes:
9 Explicit Familialism, Implicit Familialism, Optional Familialism and DeFamilialism. Both the Explicit and Implicit Familialism strengthen the family role in childcare provision and lack an alternative to family care by not providing accessible and affordable childcare services. In Explicit Familialism, this is done through the provision of family benefits, and in the Implicit Familialism by not providing parents with any public support, which implicitly puts the responsibility for childcare within the family. In contrast, both the Optional Familialism and De-Familialism unburden family in its caring function. However, Optional Familialism gives parents a possibility to choose between preferred forms of childcare (between the family care and the formal care), while De-Familialism does not actively support the family care and facilitates a participation of parents at the labour market through the state or market provision of care services. Although postcommunist countries were not initially included in this typology, Javornik (2014) applied Leitner's "Varieties of Familialism" framework to eight post-communist countries that joined the EU in 2004. She concluded that Poland, Latvia and Slovakia belong to Implicit Familialism, as they do not provide public support to parents and the responsibility for childcare is implicitly placed within the family. Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia were further classified into Explicit Familialism since they supported family childcare through longer paid parental leave and reinforced gendered parenting. However, Lithuania and Slovenia did not fit into Leitner's ideal types and were placed within a new ideal type, Supported De-Familialism, as their leave policies and childcare services are contingent on women's continuous employment. Specifically, these countries "pragmatically shift social investment from familial childcare to public childcare in order to facilitate women's continuous employment" with the crossover point between the two policy approaches located at the child's first birthday (Javornik, 2014: 253) .
The main goal of the present paper is to examine how both the individual and country-level socialization factors affect the childcare attitudes. However, in light of recent demands for the increased state intervention in the area of family policy at the European level and considering the complementarity of the political-sociological approach to welfare state attitudes with the regime thesis, we will especially focus on examining whether socialization in a particular welfare regime influences attitudes about the state's responsibility related to childcare. Despite all the challenges related to the welfare regime classifications and their consequent operationalizations, we consider the welfare regimes to be predictors of high explanatory power which stems in particular from the feedback loop between people's preferences and expectations and the institutional persistence of certain policies (compare Brooks & Manza, 2007 , Swallfors, 2012a . At the same time, the effects of socialization in welfare state regimes are still unclear in the current state of research, and we believe that our work can contribute to solving this puzzle. Specifically, in order to examine if indeed a more family-policy-nuanced categorization of welfare regimes better captures cross-country variations in childcare policies attitudes, our analyses will include both the classical Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare regimes (extended with the Southern and Post-Communist Regime) and Leitner's "Varieties of Familialism" typology (extended with Javornik's Supported De-Familialism Regime).
DATA, MEASURES AND METHODS
The individual-level data in this study is based on the Family and Changing Gender Roles IV Module from the 2012 Inter-national Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which examines attitudes on family life and marriage, gender and gender roles. In this study we focus exclusively on 24 European countries that were part of the 2012 ISSP. The individual-level data is complemented by the country-level data from the World Bank (1997, 2011) , the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2015) and the World Religion Dataset 1945-2010 (Maoz & Henderson, 2013) .
Dependent Variable: Primary Responsibility for Childcare Cost for Child under School Age
We use the variable measuring attitudes on who is primarily responsible for covering childcare cost for child under school age as a dependent variable.
10 This variable was originally measured as a nominal variable consisting of three discrete choices: family, government/public funds and employers. However, considering that the multilevel analysis on nominal responses is computationally quite intense, and that the third category "employers" was chosen by only 2.94% respondents, we decided to exclude it from the main analyses which were, instead, conducted on the dichotomous response where the choices for the primary responsibility for childcare cost were the family (chosen by 51.56% of respondents in the original variable) and the government/public funds (chosen by 45.50% of respondents in the original variable). However, we also ran additional analyses examining which respondents had the highest probability of choosing "employers" vs. "family" or "government/public funds" as being primarily responsible for covering childcare cost. The information on all the variables used in the analyses is available from Table 2 .
Independent Variable: Two Classifications of the Welfare Regime Types Table 1 presents the categorization of 24 countries included in this analysis into both the Classical Esping-Andersen's and Leitner's "Varieties of Familialism" Classifications (with their extensions). Due to the post-communist legacy of East Germany, we analyse East and West Germany separately. Where possible, we followed the classifications of countries found in the literature. However, some countries were more problematic. Iceland was not included in the original Esping-Andersen's classification and it does not fit well into Esping-Andersen's typology. It is usually described as a mixture of Nordic/SocialDemocratic and Liberal models, as there is an emphasis on universal social security, but the role of the state is less extensive than in other Nordic countries and there is a greater accent on flat-rate and meanstested benefits. However, since public services are well developed, and the provision of childcare services is quite extensive and an essential part of social policy (Björk Eydal and Ólafsson, 2016), we consider Iceland as a member of Social-Democratic Regime. Leitner (2003) classified Finland as belonging to Optional Familialism de- 10 We initially planned to compare the analyses on the dependent variable "Primary responsibility for covering childcare cost for child one year under school age" with the analyses on the dependent variable "Primary responsibility for providing childcare for child one year under school age". However, the use of the latter variable was not possible due to the missing values on most explanatory variables being predicted by the providing childcare variable. This excluded the possibility of using listwise deletion as a method of treating missing data in the analyses with the providing childcare variable as a dependent variable. As this was also a five-category nominal variable, we were unable to implement alternative missing data treatments (such as multiple imputation) since the combination of such methods with multilevel analysis of nominal responses is, to our knowledge, currently impossible in the conventional statistical software. 
Self-Interest Controls
We control for self-interest variables that may influence support for childcare policies, both at the individual and at the aggregate/country level (see Table 2) . At the individual level, we include controls for gender, age and education (the highest completed degree), as well as for the legal partnership status of the respondent (married/in civil partnership or not), the respondent and/or their partner being in paid work (both of them, one of them, neither of them)
11 and the number of young children in the household (in each country, this included children up to one year before school age).
12 At the country level, we control for country's unemployment level in 2011, a year before the onset of the survey (grand-mean centred, World Bank/ International Labour Organization /ILO/), country's Human Development Index (HDI) in 2011, which is a summary measure of health, education and standard of living in a country that we take as an indicator of its modernization level (grand-mean centred, UNDP), and country's female labour force participation in 2011 (grandmean centred, World Bank/modelled ILO estimates).
Socialization Controls
At the individual level, we control for the effects of socialization by including two measures of belonging to a religious community: religious affiliation and attendance of religious services once a month or more often. We also examine exposure to (non)traditional gender role models at a young age by controlling whether the respondent's mother worked for pay before they were 14. 13 Further, in addition to the welfare regime type, which is our independent variable, we use the following socialization controls at the country level: women's involvement in formal political system, which is measured both by the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments in 2011 and by the change in the proportion of parliamentary seats held by women between 1997 and 2011 (grandmean centred, World Bank/Inter-Parliamentary Union), and country's religious tradition.
14 The details on the socialization controls are available from Table 2. 11 In analyses, we treat this as an ordinal variable where the households with both respondent and partner/spouse are considered least vulnerable, and the households with neither of them in paid work as the most vulnerable.
12 Unfortunately, due to the characteristics of the ISSP dataset, we were not able to include more specific measures of the socio-economic status such as income or class measure. The dataset currently does not provide an internationally comparable measure of income, and the International Socio-Economic Index (calculated from the occupation measure ISCO-88) has a large number of missing data, which would make a listwise deletion, our preferred method of dealing with the missing values in this analysis, impossible (see Missing Data section for further details). The similar problem exists with the subjective measure of respondent's status, the variable asking for selfplacement on the top or bottom in society on a 10-point scale. 13 We were unable to include a control of individual political ideology, since the only available such measure, party voted for in the last election placed on the left-right continuum, included a large number of missing values.
14 Country's religious tradition was determined based on three sources. First, we used the CIA World Factbook to determine which religious tradition has most adherents in a particular country according to its last census. Then we checked the correspondence of this data with the Pew Research Center's data on Religious Composition by Country in 2010. However, since in determining the religious tradition, historic religious heritage may be more relevant than current religious composition, our final conclusion was based on trends in religious composition in each country since World War Two in the World Religion Dataset. Several countries (such as the Czech Republic, Germany, Great Britain, Latvia, Belgium and Netherlands) have in this period experienced decreasing numbers of religious adherents and increasing numbers of unaffiliated individuals, but we have based our final categorization on the religious tradition that has been dominant through the years, even if weakened in recent years. 
Method of Analysis and the Missing Data
We estimated the data using multi-level modelling for binary outcomes with logit link in Stata 12.1 (xtmelogit), which uses Full Maximum Likelihood Method (FML) with numerical integration (adaptive Gaussian quadrature). The multi-level modelling takes into consideration the clustered structure of the data (individuals clustered in countries), and the FML with numerical integration allows for testing the fit of the model and the significance of the random parts by likelihood ratio tests (Snijders & Bosker, 1999.) .
The main analyses on the dependent variable "Choosing Government/Public Funds vs Family as being Primarily Responsible for Childcare Cost for Child under School Age" were conducted on all the respondents who have chosen either government or family in the original ISSP variable, and who, furthermore, had full information on all the variables included in the models (the latter led to the loss of 10.93% of the data). This included 27,746 indivi- duals in 24 countries. We also conducted additional analyses on all the respondents who have chosen government, family or employers in the original ISSP variable, and who additionally had full information on all the variables included in the models (the latter led to the loss of 11.04% of the data). This included 28,606 individuals in 24 countries.
In both the main and the additional analyses we treated the missing data by the conventional method of the listwise deletion. Although this method has been criticized for the possibility of inflating standard errors and producing biased estimates, it has also been shown that this is the method most robust to violations of MAR pattern (missing-at-random) in regression analyses, as long as the independent variables do not depend on the values of the dependent variable (Allison, 2002) . After checking for the latter with a series of logistic regressions of dummy variables with missing data on each variable considered for the analysis of all possible dependent variables, we included only those varia-bles in the modelling that do not violate this condition (that is, whose missing values were not predicted by the dependent variable of our analysis). We then proceeded to use the listwise deletion as the simplest method. Using any other method would be computationally much more intensive and at times even impossible considering that we are using a method of analysis that is in itself computationally complex (multilevel modelling for binary outcomes).
RESULTS
Main Analysis: Choosing Government/ Public Funds vs Family as being Primarily Responsible for Childcare Cost for Child under School Age
Descriptive statistics suggests a variation between countries in the beliefs as to who is primarily responsible for childcare.
As seen from Table 3 , over 70% respondents from countries such as East Germany, Sweden and Iceland believe that financing of childcare is the responsibility of government/public funds. In contrast, this is a minority view in countries such as Hungary, the Netherlands, Croatia and Switzerland (30% or less share it), and particularly in Bulgaria (only 15% of respondents chose government/public funds over family). After estimating the so-called empty model with no explanatory variables, we calculated its intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) which suggests that 13.55% of variance in the choice of government/public funds over family is due to between-country variation. Therefore, we proceeded with the multilevel modelling for binary outcomes in order to identify factors contributing to this variation (Snijders & Bosker, 1999) . + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05 (two-tailed for fixed effects, one-tailed for random effects) Source: ISSP 2012. Our results suggest two main findings. First, the models with "Varieties of Familialism" welfare regimes better explain the between-country variation in the support for government/public funds over family as financially responsible for childcare than the classical operationalization of welfare regimes. Specifically, the respondents from "Supported De-Familialism" and "Optional Familialism" are most likely to believe that government/public funds are responsible for childcare financing. Second, in models with "Varieties of Familialism" welfare regimes, no other country-level covariates have a statistically significant effect on the preference for government/public funds, but there is a significant effect of individual-level covariates: increased age (with diminishing effects, though), having a MA/PhD degree, religious belonging, having more young children in the household and the exposure to the working mother at a young age. However, our results also suggest that the effects of the last two variables should be considered together with the effects of the regime types.
These conclusions are based on estimating eight multilevel models (see Table  4 ). Model 1 (random intercept model) and Model 2 (fixed-effects random coefficient model of within-group variability) examine the significance of the individual-level covariates. These results suggests that age, education, religious affiliation, whether mother worked for pay before the respondent was 14 and a number of young children in a household all have significant effects on choosing government/public funds vs. family as being primarily responsible for childcare cost.
In Models 3-6 we included country-level covariates in order to explicitly examine between-country variability (fixed-effects models). We provide parallel analyses for classical welfare regimes (Models 3 and 5) and for "Varieties of Familialism" welfare regimes (Model 4 and 6). The lower AIC statistics (see Table 4 ) and the likelihood ratio tests suggest that models with country-level covariates provide a better fit than models with only individual-level covariates. Further, there are clear differences in the effects of covariates in the models with classical welfare regimes and the models with "Varieties of Familialism" welfare regimes.
First, when comparing Models 3 and 4, which include only significant individuallevel covariates and all country-level covariates, we see that classical regime categories are not jointly statistically significant in predicting the choice of government/public funds over family (Model 3). In contrast, the "Varieties of Familialism" welfare regimes remain jointly statistically significant for that choice (Wald test: χ 2 (4) =12.40, p<0.05). Second, in both Models 3 and 4, most other country-level covariates have no statistically significant effect (p<0.05) on the preference for government/public funds. However, there is one important differencein the Model 3 with (non-significant) classical regime categories, the effect of country's religious tradition on the preference for government/public funds is statistically significant (p<0.05), while the country's religious tradition is not statistically significant in the Model 4 with the "Varieties of Familialism" welfare regimes.
After examining AIC statistics (see Table 3 ) and the likelihood ratio tests, we proceed with the Model 6 as our final fixedeffects model. The Model 6 with "Varieties of Familialism" welfare regimes and without country's religious tradition has better fit than all previous models, and also than the Model 5 (LR χ ing with classical regime categories -the model without regime categories, but with jointly significant religious tradition categories. The Model 6, then, indicates that age (with quadratic function), education, individuals' religious affiliation, and "Varieties of Familialism" welfare regime are statistically significant predictors (p<0. The average predicted probability for observed data, that is, the average probability of outcome if everyone in the data was treated as if they had the value of the variable in question (from fixed part of the model only).
For better understanding of differences between various "Varieties of Familialism" regimes, we now present a graphical representation of predicted probabilities of choosing government/public funds over family for a typical respondent from Model 6 (Graph 1). This illustration suggests that respondents from Supported De-Familialism welfare regime are most likely to support government as the provider of childcare cost. Further, in Table 5 we present the average predicted probabilities which also put the individuals from Supported De-Familialism at the top, followed by the individuals from Optional Familialism (there are no statistical significant differences between the two). On the other side are the respondents from Explicit Familialism and DeFamilialism whose predicted probabilities of choosing government rather than family as providers of childcare cost are the lowest (there are no statistical significant differences between the two). The results from Model 6 show that the differences in predicted probability of choosing government rather than family between Supported De-Familialism regimes and Explicit Familialism Further examination of Model 6 shows that although age with its quadratic function remains jointly significant (Wald test: χ 2 (2) = 81.25, p<0.05), as they were in earlier models as well, the coefficients for both age and its 2 nd order polynomial function are quite small (see Table 4 ). Again, this is well illustrated in Graph 1 where the change in predicted probability for supporting government for a typical respondent in different regimes across years of age is very mild. For the ease of interpretation, we have presented odds ratios and percent changes in odds for Model 6 in Table 5 . The figures suggest that for an increase in each year of age, the probability of supporting government increases 0.2%, but that this increase decelerates 0.02% for each year, holding other covariates constant (see Table 5 ). In Model 6, education categories are also jointly significant (Wald test: χ 2 (6) = 15.89, p<0.05). Specifically, we observe that those most highly educated (upper tertiary degree) stand out in their probability to support government/public funds (see Table  5 ). They do not differ significantly from those with least education (only primary school or no formal schooling), but individuals with Master or PhD are statistically significantly more likely to support government/ public funds as providers of childcare costs than those who have degrees from secondary, post-secondary / non-tertiary and lower tertiary education (see Table 4 ). The greatest difference is between those with upper tertiary and post-secondary / nontertiary degrees, as belonging to the latter group decreases the odds of supporting government/public funds as responsible for childcare cost for 16.3% compared to those most highly educated, holding other covariates constant (see Table 5 ).
Religious belonging also seems to have an impact, where those with the Protestant religious affiliation have the lowest probability of supporting government over family (Table 5) (1) = 4.15, p<0.05). Indeed, the last two groups have the highest average predicted probability of supporting government (see Table 5 ).
Finally, the probability of choosing government over family as responsible for childcare cost is affected by the number of young children in the household and by the exposure to the non-traditional family model (mother working before the respondent was 14). Those individuals whose mothers worked have 7.6% higher odds of supporting government than those whose mothers did not work. Also, for every additional young child in the household, the odds of believing government is responsible for childcare cost are increased for 19.5%, holding all other covariates constant (see Table 5 ).
The results presented above are based on our final fixed-effects model, Model 6. However, in our final two models (Model 7 and Final Model in Table 4 ) we included random slopes for two individual-level variables from Model 6 (the number of young children and having a working mother) that, we suspected, may function differently in different regimes. The results of likelihood ratio tests comparing models with and without random slopes for the two models which, respectively, included a random slope for number of young children and a random slope for a working mother suggest that this, indeed, may be the case. Model 7, therefore, included the random slopes for both of these variables. We also included cross-level interactions of the number of young children and the mother working with the "varieties of familialism" regimes in an attempt to account for some of the variation in the random slopes, and we tested for their significance. In our final Random Effects Model (Final model in Table 4 The results from the Final Random Effects Model do not change the main interpretation of all other covariates, as presented on the basis of Model 6, but they do suggest that the main effects of a number of young children in the household and the exposure to the working mother at a young age should be considered together with the effects of the interaction with regime types. Specifically, our Final Model suggests that the individuals whose mother worked before they were 14 are statistically significantly more likely to support government as a provider of childcare cost in Implicit Familialism regime than in Optional Familialism regime. Also, a greater number of young children in their household makes individuals from Supported De-Familialism regime statistically significantly more likely to choose government as responsible for childcare cost than the individuals with a larger number of young children in Optional Familialism regime.
Additional Analysis: Choosing Employers as being Primary Responsible for Childcare Cost for Child under School Age
On the original ISSP variable asking respondents who is primarily responsible for childcare cost (government/public funds, family itself or employers), only 2.94% has chosen employers. We considered such a small minority disregardable for the purposes of our main analyses. Nevertheless, we have conducted additional analyses to see what increases the probability of choosing such a minority option vs. choosing government or family as providers of childcare cost. In these analyses, we have conducted steps of model building similar to the ones described in our main analysis, but as this is not of our main interest, we will not go into details. Instead, we will present our final model only: π ij = logistic (γ 00 + γ 10 female ij + γ 20 age ij + γ 30 agesq ij + γ 0, [1] [2] [3] [4] Cregime ij + u 0j ). This Fixed Effects model contains only statistically significant predictors (p<0.05) of choosing employers vs. government or family: age with its quadratic function (jointly statistically significant: χ 2 (2) = 11.69, p<0.05) and gender at individual-level, and the welfare regime categories at country-level (see Table 6 ). This model suggests that females are more likely to belong to the minority group believing that employers are responsible for childcare cost and that with the increase in the years of age, individuals are less likely to choose employers vs. government or family, although this decrease also happens at the slower rate with each year. Finally, a particularly interesting finding is that in choosing the minority option of employers and not the more typical options of government or family, it is the classical welfare regimes that prove jointly statistically significant, and not the "varieties of familialism" regimes as in the main analyses. Specifically, as illustrated in Graph 2, the respondents from Southern regimes have the highest predicted probability of choosing employers, followed by the respondents from Conservative-Corporatist regimes (there are no statistically significant differences between the two). At the bottom are the respondents from Social-Democratic regimes who cluster together with the respondents from the Post-communist regimes (there are no statistically significant differences between the two). The statistically significant difference in the probability of choosing the minority option of employers exist between the Social Democratic regimes and Southern (χ cal limitations, we focused our analysis on one aspect of childcare attitudes only, their financial dimension, excluding other dimensions such as functional dimension of the welfare state, i.e. weather the childcare provision should even be among the functions of the welfare state. However, as Andreß & Heien (2001) stressed, the attitudes towards the functions of welfare state are contingent on the attitudes towards other dimensions of welfare state (means, effects and financing) -therefore, if citizens see no governmental responsibility for ensuring social security, they will not consider state financially responsible for childcare. An analysis organised around attitudes towards financial dimension of childcare is thus a legitimate approach and it may well grasp variations in citizens' attitudes towards the government's role in childcare.
The findings convey a complex picture of determinants associated with the attitudes towards the government's role in childcare. The direction of the relationship of significant predictors generally follows the pattern usually reported in the literature. Support for higher government's involvement in financing of childcare is closely connected to one's structural position and socialization patterns. An important finding of our study shows that the "Varieties of Familialism" typology (Leitner, 2003) better accounts for cross-national variations in childcare attitudes than the classical Esping-Andersen's (1990, 1999) typology of welfare regimes. Leitner's typology provides a more family-policy-nuanced categorization of welfare regimes which is more sensitive to cross-national differences in childcare policies and practices, so this finding supports the importance of applying a programmatic approach in analyses of welfare state attitudes which allows linking public support for specific social programs to its unique characteristics (see Jordan, 2013) . That is particularly important when analysing the welfare state attitudes in social policy areas which may not perfectly fit into the broader welfare regime of a particular country. Childcare policies are one such area, as the policy logics underlying the development of early childhood education and care programs is not principally concerned with redistribution issues, but it is often guided by different motives, such as work-family balance or the importance of early education (Scheiwe & Willekens, 2009 ). This may increase the support for government's involvement in childcare provision even in welfare regimes that otherwise prioritize other actors in dealing with social issues or which are more residual in general character. Based on these findings, we propose the necessity of problematizing the criteria used in defining certain welfare-state typology before automatically considering its effects on a particular policy area. Additionally, the problem of utilizing the classical EspingAndersen's (1990 EspingAndersen's ( , 1999 typology of welfare regimes in explaining cross-national variations in childcare attitudes may become particularly pronounced in the analyses that involve post-communist countries and classify them as one, post-communist cluster, since this is based more on general characteristics of the welfare regime in these countries, rather than on actual character of their childcare policies. Specifically, while the post-communist countries may have similar expectations about the role of the state in social area due to common experience of communist statism (see Vuč-ković Juroš, 2012), they are also marked by important differences in family policy legacy with some of them giving higher priority to public childcare at the earliest age, and the others stressing the importance of the family (see e. g. Inglot, 2008; Inglot et al., 2011; Dobrotić, 2012) . Hence, due to different policy logics behind the development of family policies in these countries, as well as a variety of already established childcare practices, and following policy feedback arguments (e.g. Goerres & Tepe, 2012 , Pierson, 1994 , one should expect that they are also going to favour different actors in the childcare financing, as this paper demonstrates.
The findings in this paper indicate that welfare regime practices and ideologies are closely related with citizens' welfare expectations. The "Varieties of Familialism" regimes predicted the public support for the government's role in childcare in an expected way. The higher support for the government's financing of childcare was found in the countries of those regimes which are marked by comprehensive early childhood education and care systems, predominantly publicly provided and financed (Supported De-familialism and Optional Familialism). In contrast, the support was lower in the countries which implicitly or explicitly supported the family in its caring function, and which were characterized by the lack of state involvement in early childhood education and care provision or financing (De-familialism and Explicit Familialism). 16 Given the fact that a policy emphasis in the latter countries is put on childcare as a private, rather than family responsibility, this finding is not surprising as it speaks about citizens' lower welfare expectations in the area of childcare financing.
Another interesting finding is that the individual self-interest and socialization factors vary among the welfare regimes. Individuals whose mother worked before they were 14 were more likely to support government's involvement in financing of childcare in Implicit Familialism than in Optional Familialism regime. Also, a greater number of young children in household made individuals from Supported De-Familialism regime more supportive of government's involvement in financing of childcare than the same individuals in Optional Familialism regime. We can only speculate on the reasons behind these findings. It may be that individuals with working mothers who were socialized in Optional Familialism regime in which the childcare needs are widely met and where there is a choice between the family and formal care are not that sensitive to the need for the government's involvement in childcare financing as the individuals socialized into the Implicit Familialism regime that is marked by the lack of policy support in this area. Also, different welfare expectations of families with more children in Supported De-Familialism and Optional Familialism regime may not be that surprising, as the affordable childcare services play an important role to larger families in Supported De-Familialism regime where one cannot choose a family care as an alternative to formal childcare as one can in the Optional Familialism regime. However, for more convincing conclusions, additional research, which should put additional focus on individual socialisation experience within particular welfare regime, as well as on the structural position of different individuals and families within the particular welfare regimes, is needed.
The findings of our additional analysis, focusing on the small minority choosing an employer as responsible for childcare financing, rather than state or family, are also of interest. For these cases, the classical Esping- Andersen's (1990 Andersen's ( , 1999 typology of welfare regimes served as a better predictor of cross-country variations in childcare attitudes, with countries belonging to Southern and Conservative-Corporatist Regimes prioritizing this option. As indeed only a small share of individuals chose this option, all the conclusions here can be only tentative, but a possible explanation is that in these cases the respondents did not actually evaluate family policies related to the childcare financing, but the way in which the market should function and what should be the role of employers, which are the attitudes better accounted for by EspingAndersen's typology.
Finally, these findings also have important implications for the welfare state legitimacy which is closely connected to individual's position in a particular welfare regime and the socialization in a particular welfare regime may constrain (or enable) policy reforms aimed at increasing state intervention in childcare. Namely, the policy feedback effects serve as an important "catalyst" of welfare interests, so the already existing policies and practices may (re) shape citizens' interests. Hence, as already noticed in the literature (see Jordan, 2013) , the existent policy and practices may produce path dependencies in policy development and the individuals in the countries with generous and widespread childcare services may form strong public support for the increased government's role in the area of childcare, and vice versa.
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